If we are to make sense of the PI's criticisms of the Tractatus, it doesn't seem that we can always take it at face-value. Roger White is very much of the opinion that by the time he came back to Cambridge to philosophise, he merely misunderstands the Tractatus positions. Now I don't think that; but it is at least true that what he is attacking are not the final positions of the Tractatus.
Just to name two. It is no part of the Tractatus account that names get their meaning (the object which is their meaning) via ostensive definition. The objects are simple and we cannot say anything about it other than via the state of affairs it enters into. He says that we can talk about objects but cannot put them into words (or something similar). We cannot simply go round naming simple objects whether that be via ostensive definition or otherwise. The context principle states that a name only has a meaning in the context of a proposition. In other words, a name only gets to be a name of an object, in virtue of its being part of a fact. That is, the object named is one which in combination with other objects, constitute the state of affairs pictured. Okay, this could be clearer and I don't have the Tractatus in front of me. But the point is, before analysing a proposition into a concatenation of names, we must first be able to use proposition with sense (as picturing a state of affairs). In order to see which state of affairs is pictured, we have to see how the propositions of everyday language are used.
The second misunderstanding might be that of the nature of the objects themselves. The Augustinian picture has the parent pointing at objects. But these are everyday kind of objects like tables and chairs. Wittgenstein's criticisms of the Tractatus also talk about the objects like excalibur. Now, it is nothing if not clear, that these aren't the objects of the Tractatus. He doesn't talk about tables as objects that would have its own sign in a perpiscuous notation. It might be thought, however, that the criticisms that hold for everyday objects (i.e. criticisms of the contention that we name them and talk about them in combination with other objects) holds for Tractatrian objects too. Maybe. Maybe not. 'Object' is a very deflated notion, and quite frankly we don't know what an object is, other than it serves a particular role in the account. "It makes no sense to ask whether the objects are thing like, whether they are something that stands in a subject place, or are something like a property, or are relations or so on" Moreover, in the final analysis, these wouldn't be talked about as objects at all. In fact, they just wouldn't be talked about. There would simply be signs that are used in elementary propositions. So any compunctions we have about calling names representatives of objects (because of how we do/do not use signs as names for everyday options) may just disappaear.
Of course these may not be misunderstandings. But it is clear we need to ask why critcisms of the Augustinian picture go over wholesale to the Tractatus when the Tractatus doesn't explicitly support the positions being attacked (e.g. that '3' refers to an object). It very much depends on what the target of PI is and I suspect it is one that has little to do with the specifics of Tractatus positions. If it is interested in those specifics, it is in trouble.
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2 comments:
White's view that Wittgenstein later misunderstands the TLP is shared by Anthony Kenny (see his "The Ghost of the Tractatus" in The Legacy of Wittgenstein). I think this is completely wrong. All of Wittgenstein's alleged misunderstanding turn out to be misunderstandings by Kenny.
It is no part of the Tractatus account that names get their meaning (the object which is their meaning) via ostensive definition.
I'm inclined to disagree. Following Hacker, I take 3.263 to be an opaque discussion of (what was later called) 'ostensive definition' (See Hacker's "Frege and Wittgenstein on Elucidations in Mind, Vol. 84, No. 336).
PI §40 says,
Let us first discuss this point of the argument: that a word has no meaning if nothing corresponds to it.—It is important to note that the word "meaning" is being used illicitly if it is used to signify the thing that 'corresponds' to the word. That is to confound the meaning of a name with the bearer of the name. When Mr. N. N. dies one says that the bearer of the name dies, not that the meaning dies. And it would be nonsensical to say that, for if the name ceased to have meaning it would make no sense to say "Mr. N. N. is dead."
This can't be a criticism of the Tractatus. N. N. is the name of a complex, and according to the TLP, "A proposition that mentions a complex will not be nonsensical, if the complex does not exits, but simply false" (3.24)
Thanks for the reference to Hacker's article, I will check it out.
1) However, I find it hard to believe that we elucidate the simple objects of the Tractatus by ostensive definition. This is not to say there is no ost. def., just that it what the definitions are of are precisely the kind that appear in PI- "This is a circle". Now circles aren't Tractatus objects. Just like in 3.24 a complex can be contracted into a simple sign, ostensive def might be able to do the same job.
The above point is saying that we don't, as a matter of fact ostensively define indvidual Tractatus objects. But even if we wanted to I'm not sure where I would start. Nor would I be able, although this might be my lack of imagination, to name something by pointing to a state of affairs pictured by an elementary proposition (at least not directing attention 'only' to that state of affairs).
2) Moreover, as I said in the post, it just doesn't seem right in the Tractatus that we are able to 'simply' go round naming objects. There is nothing to say what the simple object is. A simple object qua simple object is highly uninteresting. We can only know about an object by knowing its internal relations; what objects it joins with.
3)"So they can only be understood if the meanings of the signs are already known" This just seems like an expression of his contention that i) in logic there are no surprises ii) the sense is composed of the contributions of its components. We must already be 'conversant' with the simple objects. After all, they are what form the 'substance of the world' and allow us to have propositions with sense. Given that, elucidations will consist in 'reminding us' of the symbol by pointing out the propositions within which they occur (which we understand and can use with sense).
4) Now I do agree that WIttgenstein's talk about 'ostensive definition' isn't futile or merely based on a misunderstanding. It is just not something that we directly do. "We don't name objects, but use propositions with sense"
Instead, and I will have to explain properly another time, that the Tractatus relies on a form of 'mental ostension'. When we use a proposition with sense, the 'psychic elements' that correspond to the objects 'reach out to reality'. There is a kind of mental pointing that assures the symbol is of 'that' object. The mind mimics what we do, when we say that x means 'that'.
I also wanted to say something about your second point but I'll wait till tomorrow night. Friedrich Nietsche is waiting for me in bed and I'm going to work tommorow. Good night :-) Thanks again for leaveing comments
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